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CHAPTER 9 
Constitutional Law 
WILLIAM T. OORBETT* 
§ 9.1. Due Process - Eighth Amendment - Obligation to Provide and 
Pay for Medical Attention for Pre-Trial Detainee. In Estelle v. Gamble,! 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the eighth amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment2 is violated by "deliber-
ate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners."3 In reaching this 
holding, the Estelle Court observed that incarceration deprives prisoners 
of the ability to provide themselves with basic necessities. 4 Under Estelle, 
the responsibility of maintaining the well-being of prisoners, therefore, 
shifts to the state.s The Estelle decision did not, however, clearly estab-
lish whether pre-trial detention as well as post-conviction imprisonment 
implicates the state's eighth amendment responsibility to provide medical 
care to prisoners. Estelle also did not address the issue of whether the 
duty of a state to provide medical care for prisoners also includes the 
obligation to pay for such care. 
During the Survey year in Massachusetts General Hospital v. City of 
Revere6 the Supreme Judicial Court considered some of the issues left 
open by the Estelle decision. Specifically, the Court examined the obliga-
tion of a municipality to provide and pay for medical treatment for a 
pre-trial detainee. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that a munici-
pality is obligated under the eighth amendment to the federal constitution 
to both provide and pay for necessary medical attention while the injured 
person is a pre-trial detainee.7 On a writ of certiorari, however, the United 
* WILLIAM T. CORBETT is an Associate Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law 
School. 
§ 9.1. I 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
2 The eighth amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The 
eighth amendment is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
3 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
4 ld. at 103-04. 
5 See id. The Estelle Court held that a prisoner's allegation that prison officials were 
intentionally indifferent to his medical needs states a cause ofaction under 42 U .S.C. § 1983. 
ld. at 105. 
6 385 Mass. 772, 434 N.E.2d 185 (1982). 
7 ld. at 776-79, 434 N.E.2d at 188-89. 
1
Corbett: Chapter 9: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1982
318 1982 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 9.1 
States Supreme Court reversed, rulIng that the Massachusetts Court had 
over-extended the reasoning of the Estelle decision.8 
On September 20, 1978, officers of the Revere Police Department 
responded to a suspected breaking and entering.9 At the scene, the 
officers observed William Kivlin fleeing with a suitcase and pillowcase in 
hand. 10 When exhortations and a warning shot fired by one ofthe officers 
failed to halt the fleeing Kivlin, an officer shot and wounded him. II Kivlin 
was taken by ambulance to Massachusetts General Hospital ("MGH") 
where he remained hospitalized for nine days.12 He then was released into 
the custody of the Revere Police Department and taken to Chelsea Dis-
trict Court for a probable cause determination.13 The court immediately 
granted a continuance and released Mr. Kivlin on his own recognizance. 14 
On October 18, 1978, MGH sent a bill in the amount of $7,948.50 to the 
Revere Chief of Police for services rendered by the hospital during Kiv-
lin's nine day stay, 15 The chief disclaimed any responsibility for the bill by 
promptly notifying the hospital that Revere had no procedure for making 
such payment,16 Several days later, Mr. Kivlin was admitted again to 
MGH,17 He underwent surgery and remained hospitalized for approxi-
mately two weeks. The bill for this second stay amounted to $5,360.14. 18 
MGH initiated suit against Revere in the Boston Municipal Court De-
partment seeking to recover the full amount of its costs for both of 
Kivlin's hospital visits. 19 Revere filed a third party complaint against 
Kivlin and the Commonwealth.20 MGH moved for summary judgment. 2 I 
The case was referred to a special master who recommended denial of 
MGH's motion, dismissal of Revere's third party complaint, and judg-
ment in favor of Revere,22 The superior court adopted those recommen-
dations. 23 MGH appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the 
case to its own docket. 24 
8 City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 103 S. Ct. 2979 (1983). 
9 385 Mass. at 772, 434 N.E.2d at 185. 
10 Id. at 773, 434 N.E.2d at 186. 
II/d. 
12Id. 
13 Id. 
14Id. 
IS Id. at 773 n.l, 434 N.E.2d at 186 n.t. 
16 Id. at 773, 434 N.E.2d at 186. 
17 Id. The record did not reveal the nature of this second hospitalization or whether it was 
related to the original injury. Id. at 773 n.4, 434 N.E.2d at 186 n.4. 
18 Id. at 773 n.5, 434 N.E.2d at 186 n.S. 
19Id. at 773-74, 434 N.E.2d at 186. 
20 Id. at 774, 434 N.E.2d at 186. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24Id. 
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In support of its contention that Revere was obligated to pay for the 
medical services provided Kivlin, MGH relied on contract principles and 
on the eighth amendment to the federal constitution. 25 MGH's eighth 
amendment claim was premised on Estelle v. Gamble, 26 a decision where 
the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment obli-
gates government "to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing 
by incarceration. "27 Revere asserted that the principle of Estelle was 
inapplicable because Kivlin had not in fact been incarcerated prior to 
being taken to MGH.28 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court rejected MGH's contract argu-
ment,29 it found some merit in the hospital's eighth amendment conten-
25 Id. No claim was made by MGH, or considered sua sponte by the court, that Revere's 
action violated the Massachusetts Constitution. 
26 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
27 /d. at 103. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
28 385 Mass. at 777, 434 N.E.2d at 188. Kivlin was not arraigned until after he was 
discharged from his initial stay at MGH. Id. at 773, 434 N.E.2d at 186. 
29 Id. at 774, 434 N .E.2d at 186. MGH asserted that it was entitled to recover pursuant to 
either an implied contract, or, in the absence of a contract, quantum meruit.ld. at 774, 776, 
434 N.E.2d at 186-87; cf. Lord v. Winchester, 355 Mass. 788, 789, 244 N.E.2d 730, 731 
(1969). The Court noted that a city can enter into a valid contract only when it has both the 
authority to do so and the contract is executed by a duly authorized agent of the city. 385 
Mass. at 774-75, 434 N.E.2d at 186-87. Although G.L. c. 40, § 4 permits a municipality to 
contract for health services, it limits those who can so contract on behalf of a municipality to 
"the board of health or any legally constituted board performing the powers and duties of a 
board of health." G.L. c. 40, § 4. The police, clearly not an analogue to a board of health, 
therefore lacked any statutory authority to contract for Kivlin's care. 385 Mass. at 774-75, 
434 N.E.2d at 187. Such authority also was not provided by common law. Indeed, the 
authority for a municipality to contract is solely a creature of statute.ld. at 775, 434 N .E.2d 
at 187 (citing Urban Transportation, Inc. v. Boston, 373 Mass. 693, 696, 369 N.E.2d 1135, 
1137 (1977); Kimball Co. v. Medford, 340 Mass. 727, 729, 166 N.E.2d 708, 709 (1960». 
Apart from a general lack of authority, the Court further noted that only a duly authorized 
agent of the city can execute a contract on behalf of a city. 385 Mass. at 775, 434 N .E.2d at 
187. G.L. c. 41, § 98 describes in detail the powers of police. The power to contract is not 
among them. 
Other impediments to a valid contract also existed. 385 Mass. at 775, 434 N.E.2d at 187. 
For example, any contract a municipality makes in excess of $2,000 must be in writing. G.L. 
c. 43, § 29. Except in compelling situations, a municipal department cannot spend above its 
appropriated amount. G.L. c. 44, § 31. Even assuming that the situation in this case can be 
considered compelling, a two thirds vote of the city council would have been necessary to 
validate the expenditure. Id. Parties contracting with municipalities are deemed to have 
constructive notice of these limitations. See Duff v. Southbridge, 325 Mass. 224, 228, 90 
N.E.2d 12, 15 (1950); Adalian Bros. v. Boston, 323 Mass. 629,631,84 N.E.2d 35, 37 (1949). 
With regard to its quantum meruit argument, MGH was equally unsuccessful. As noted by 
the Court, "[wlhere a contract is illegal by reason of failure to comply with statutory 
requisites, we will not allow recovery based on quantum meruit . . . . Mistake, even if 
mutual, as to the authority or power of a municipality to contract, is not the type of mistake 
which will allow recovery in quantum meruit." 385 Mass. at 776, 434 N.E.2d at 187 (citing 
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tion.30 The Court rejected Revere's attempt to distinguish Estelle based 
on the lack of actual incarceration prior to the medical treatment. 31 
According to the Court, actual prior incarceration is not required to 
trigger the eighth amendment; rather, the test is whether' 'the prisoner ... 
by reason of the deprivation of his liberty [is unable] to care for him-
self."32 Identifying factors necessary to constitute an arrest, at least for 
purposes of the fourth and fifth amendment,33 the Court concluded that, 
certainly by the time the bullet penetrated Kivlin' s body, the Revere 
Police Department had effectuated his arrest. 34 The Court ruled that 
because Kivlin was then in police custody, and thus deprived of his 
liberty, Revere was obligated to provide him with medical care. 35 Fur-
thermore, the Court decided, Revere also had the duty to pay for such 
medical attention. 36 In the Court's view, requiring payment by the munic-
ipality was the only way to safeguard the detainee's right to medical 
care. 37 The Court observed that a lack of appropriated funds would 
provide no defense for the government because inadequate funding can-
not excuse a violation of constitutional rights.38 
The Court expressly limited Revere's obligation, however, to Kivlin's 
first stay at MGH.39 Regarding Kivlin's second visit to the hospital, the 
Court explained that once Kivlin was released on his own recognizance, 
he was no longer unable to provide for his own medical needs due to any 
Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 272, 47 N.E.2d 265, 275 
(1943); Fluet v. McCabe, 299 Mass. 173, 178, 12 N.E. 89, 93 (1938». 
30 385 Mass. at 774, 779-80, 434 N.E.2d at 186, 189-90. 
31 /d. at 777, 434 N.E.2d at 188. 
32 [d. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104 (1976), quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 
191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926». 
33 [d. at 778, 434 N.E.2d at 188. To constitute an arrest, according to the Court, three 
elements must be present: 
[1] there must be an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, [2] 
performed with the intention to effect an arrest, and [3] so understood by the person 
detained . . . [T]he test must not be what the defendant ... thought, but what a 
reasonable man, innocent of any crime would have thought had he been in the 
defendant's shoes. 
/d. at 778, 434 N.E.2d at 188-89 (citing Hicks v. United States, 382 F.2d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 
1967), quoting from Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99, 101 (lOth Cir. 1949) and United 
States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D. D.C. 1965». 
34 [d. at 778, 434 N.E.2d at 189. 
35 [d. Indeed, the Court observed that Revere's custody of Kivlin was such that had 
Kivlin refused to submit to medical treatment he could have been compelled to do so. [d. at 
778 n.9, 434 N .E.2d at 189 n.9 (citing Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 
263-64, 399 N.E.2d 452, 545-56 (1979». 
36 385 Mass. at 774, 779, 434 N.E.2d at 186, 189. 
37 [d. at 779, 434 N.E.2d at 189. 
38 [d. 
39 Id. at 779-80, 434 N.E.2d at 189. 
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restriction on his liberty.40 Therefore, the Court reasoned, Revere had no 
constitutional obligation to provide or pay for medical treatment for Kivlin 
at the time of his second stay at MGH.41 
MGH petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. 42 
Because of a desire to clarify governmental responsibility in such cases 
and because of the Supreme Judicial Court's "rather novel eighth 
amendment approach, "43 certiorari was granted.44 Mter disposing of two 
threshold questions,45 the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether the federal constitution imposes on government the 
obligation to provide and pay for medical services for a pre-trial detainee 
such as Kivlin.46 In discussing that question, the Supreme Court sum-
marily rejected the Supreme Judicial Court's eighth amendment analysis.47 
With regard to providing medical care to pre-trial detainees, the Supreme 
Court noted that the government certainly does have such an obligation, 
but that duty arises under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment rather than under the eighth amendment. 48 Indeed, the Su-
40 Id. at 780, 434 N.E.2d at 189. 
41 Id. 
42 See City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 103 S. Ct. 2979 (1983). 
43 103 S. Ct. 2979, 2982 (1983). 
44 103 S. Ct. 48 (1982). 
45 MGH argued that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction on the ground that the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision rested on an adequate and independent state ground. 103 
S. Ct. at 2982. The Supreme Court rejected this assertion noting that the Supreme Judicial 
Court had indicated clearly that Massachusetts contract law provided no basis for recovery. 
Id.; see supra note 21. Furthermore, the Supreme Court observed, no claim for relief had 
been grounded on the Commonwealth's own constitution. 103 S. Ct. at 2982. In fact, the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision rested wholly on the eighth amendment. 
The Supreme Court also considered whether MGH had standing to raise the eighth 
amendment question. 103 S. Ct. at 2982. Concluding that it did, the Supreme Court said: 
[Wle could not resolve the question whether MGH has third party standing without 
addressing the constitutional issue. 'To a significant degree, the case is in the class of 
those where standing and the merits are inextricably intertwined,' [quoting Holtzman 
v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1315, 1319 (1973) (Douglas, J. in chambers)l. Both the 
standing question and the merits depend in part on whether injured suspects will be 
deprived of their constitutional right to necessary medical care unless the governmen-
tal entity is required to pay hospitals for their services. 
103 S. Ct. at 2982 n.5. 
46 ld. at 2983. 
47 /d. 
48 Id. The Supreme Court was unwilling to specify the scope of a municipality's due 
process obligation to pre-trial detainees. ld. It did note, however, that "[wlhatever the 
standard may be, Revere fulfilled its constitutional obligation by seeing that Kivlin was taken 
promptly to a hospital that provided the treatment necessary for his injury." ld. 
In Ingraham v. Wright public school students asserted that corporal punishment inflicted 
by school officials deprived them of rights guaranteed under the eighth and fourteenth 
amendment. 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977). The Supreme Court noted that the eighth amendment 
5
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preme Court observed, the eighth amendment had no application what-
soever to the case before it.49 The focal point of the eighth amendment is, 
of course, the form and severity of punishment.50 The right to punish, 
however, does not accrue to the state until after there has been a formal 
adjudication of guilt. 5 I Because Kivlin had not been adjudged guilty prior 
to his hospitalization, the Supreme Court continued, the eighth amend-
ment had not yet been implicated.52 If Kivlin's guilt had already been 
established, the Supreme Court noted, then the eighth amendment would 
have been the source of Revere's obligation to provide him medical 
care. 53 With regard to the obligation to pay for such medical care, the 
has no application outside of the criminal arena. Id. at 664. Moreover, the Ingraham Court 
observed, its protections arise only after there has been a formal adjudication of guilt. Id. at 
671 n.4O. The Ingraham Court further noted, however, that corporal punishment adminis-
tered in the public school system does implicate a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth 
amendment. /d. at 672. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in part: "[Njor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
49 103 S. Ct. at 2983. 
so Id. As explained by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, the eighth amendment 
was initially designed to prohibit torture or other forms of barbarism. 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) 
(citing Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969)). Thus, punishments such as burning at the stake, crucifix-
ion, quartering, the rack and thumb screw were clearly prohibited. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 
436,446 (1890); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); 
B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301-02 (2d ed. 1979). Over the years, however, the 
eighth amendment's proscription has broadened beyond physical torture. Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97,102 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,171 (1976)); Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Thus, 
punishments which, measured by contemporary standards, are "so degrading that [they dol 
not accord with the dignity of man," are prohibited. B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 303 (citing 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,102 (1976)). In 
addition, punishments which are grossly disproportionate to the offense, Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), or which punish the status of addiction, Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), or which "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), are repugnant to the eighth amendment. See also 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1977). 
51 103 S. Ct. at 2983 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72, n.4O (1977));' see 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, n.16 (1979). As stated by the Supreme Court in Ingraham 
v. Wright: 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the state has complied with the 
constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions .... As 
these cases demonstrate, the state does not acquire the power to punish with which 
the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of 
guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where the state seeks to impose 
punishment without such adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). 
52 103 S. Ct. at 2983. 
53 Id. at 2983-84. 
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United States Supreme Court, unlike the Supreme Judicial Court, drew a 
clear distinction between the duty to provide medical care and the respon-
sibility for paying the provider of that care.S4 The federal constitution, 
according to the Supreme Court, only imposes a duty to provide the 
treatment.ss The manner in which the state governmental entity allocates 
the cost of that treatment between itself and the provider, the Supreme 
Court stated, simply is not a federal constitutional question; rather, it is an 
issue of state law. 56 Therefore, because the Supreme Judicial Court had 
improperly concluded that the federal constitution required a municipality 
to pay for the medical care of a pre-trial detainee, an error compounded 
by the fact that the Court inaccurately grounded that conclusion on the 
eighth amendment, the United State Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment.S7 
§ 9.2. First Amendment - Establishment of Religion - School Prayer. 
During the Survey year in Opinion of Justices to the House of Representa-
tives 1 the Supreme Judicial Court once again considered the constitution-
ality of a public school prayer law. 2 House Bill No. 1454, then pending 
before the General Court, was introduced to amend chapter 71, section 
lA ofthe General Laws by deleting the existing language3 and replacing it 
54 ld. at 2983. In fact, the Supreme Court pointed out several ways in which a munici-
pality might satisfy its obligation of providing care without financially reimbursing the 
provider. ld. at 2983-84. "The governmental entity also may be able to satisfy its duty by 
operating its own hospital, or, possibly by imposing on the willingness of hospitals and 
physicians to treat the sick regardless of the individual patient's ability to repay." ld. at 
2984. In addition, the hospital already may be under an obligation to provide medical care if 
that hospital is receiving federal grant money under the HilI-Burton Act. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 291(c)(e) (1976). And, indeed, G.L. c. Ill, § 70E(k) provides: "Every patient ... shall have 
the right: . . . to prompt life saving treatment in an emergency without discrimination on 
account of economic status or source of payment. . . ." 
55 103 S. Ct. at 2984. 
561d. 
57 ld. 
§ 9.2. 1 387 Mass. 1201, 440 N.E.2d 1159 (1982). 
2 Over the past twenty years the Court has considered several cases concerning the 
constitutionality of school prayer exercises. See, e.g., Kent v. Commissioner of Education, 
380 Mass. 234,402 N.E.2d 1340 (1980); Commissioner of Education v. School Committee of 
Leyden, 358 Mass. 776, 267 N.E.2d 226 (1976); Attorney General v. School Committee of 
North Brookfield, 347 Mass. 775, 199 N.E.2d 553 (1964); Waite v. School Committee of 
Newton, 348 Mass. 767, 202 N.E.2d 297 (1964); cf Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 
378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E.2d 1195 (1979). 
3 Section lA of chapter 71 was added to the General Laws by chapter 130 of the Acts of 
1966. The Legislature added this provision in response to the Supreme Judicial Court's 
decision in Attorney General v. School Comm. of North Brookfield, 347 Mass. 775, 199 
N.E.2d 553 (1964), declaring chapter 71, section 31 of the General Laws, which required 
Bible reading in public schools, to be uncons!!tutional. Section lA remained unchanged until 
7
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with the following: 
Section lAo At the commencement of the first class of each day in all 
grades in all public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each 
class is held shall announce that a period of voluntary prayer or meditation 
may be offered by a student volunteer not to exceed one minute in duration. 
Section B. Such prayer shall not establish a religion in Public Schools, just 
as the prayer by the Chaplains of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives and the Crier of the Supreme Court does not establish [a] religion in 
our government. 4 
The House of Representatives requested the Justices to advise itS as to the 
bill's constitutionality under article II, part I of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution,6 and under the first and fourteenth amendments7 of the United 
the Legislature in chapter 621 of the Acts of 1973 amended it by adding the words "or 
prayer" so that section lA then read as follows: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools 
the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce that 
a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for 
meditation or prayer, and during any such period silence shall be maintained and no 
activities engaged in. 
The constitutionality ofthe enactment, as then amended, was affirmed by a three judge panel 
in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Gaines V. Anderson, 
421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976). See infra notes 29-43 and accompanying text. 
Subsequently, the Legislature in chapter 692 of the Acts of 1979 deleted the phrase 
"silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation and prayer" 
and replaced it with "prayer may be offered by a student volunteer." Chapter 692 also 
replaced the phrase "silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in" with "an 
excusal provision will be allowed for those students who do not wish to participate." It was 
this version of section lA, as amended by chapter 692, that was at issue in Kent v. 
Commissioner of Education, 380 Mass. 235, 402 N.E.2d 1340 (1980). The Kent Court 
concluded that section lA violated the first amendment. In response to Kent, the Legislature 
amended section lA in Chapter 144 of the Acts of 1980 by restoring the former language 
which the federal district court in Gaines had approved. House Bill No. 1454 would have 
amended the now existing version of section lA in essence by permitting oral recitation of 
prayer. 
4 See 387 Mass. at 1201-02, 440 N.E.2d at 1160. 
S MASS. CONST. part II, ch. 3, art. 2 provides: "Each branch ofthe legislature, as well as 
the governor or the council, shall have the authority to require the opinion of the justices of 
the Supreme Judicial Court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." 
The purpose behind this provision "is to enable the Justices to give such advice to the 
Legislature, the Governor, and the Council as would be necessary to enable these depart-
ments to perform their duties in a manner consistent with our constitution." Answer of the 
Justices, 373 Mass. 898, 901, 367 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1977). 
6 MASS. CONST. part I, art. II provides: 
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons 
to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe. 
And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, 
for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his 
own conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not 
disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship. 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
8
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States Constitution. 8 
At the outset the Court indicated that it would examine the bill initially 
in light of the first amendment, because if the proposed law violated that 
provision examination under the cognate provision of the Common-
wealth's constitution would be unnecessary.9 Indeed, a majority of the 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " The free exercise 
and establishment clauses address distinct forms of governmental curtailment of individual 
religious freedom. The establishment clause removes "all legislative power respecting 
religious belief or the expression thereof." Schempp v. School District of Abington, 374 
U.S. 203, 222 (1963). "The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not 
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enact-
ment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to 
coerce non-observing individuals or not." Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962). The 
free exercise clause, on the other hand, "recognizes the value of religious training, teaching 
and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own 
course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state." Schempp v. School 
District of Abington, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1962). The Supreme Court in Schempp further 
stated: 
The Free Exercise Clause withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the 
exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure 
religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil author-
ity. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of 
the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction 
between the two clauses is apparent - a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is 
predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so 
attended. 
[d. at 222-23. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part: "[Nlor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." The first amendment is 
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925). 
8 The actual questions presented to the Court by the House of Representatives were as 
follows: 
1. Would the enactment of said bill which allows voluntary permissible prayer and 
meditation in the public schools of the' Commonwealth be constitutional under 
Article II of Part I. of the Constitution of the Commonwealth? 
2. Would the enactment of said bill which allows voluntary permissible prayer and 
meditation in the public schools of the Commonwealth be constitutional under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? 
9 387 Mass. at 1202,440 N.E.2d at 1160. The Court, citing Moe v. Secretary of Adminis-
tration and Finance, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 464, 417 N.E.2d 387, noted that rendering an 
opinion on the state constitutional question would be meaningless if House Bill No. 1454 
violated the federal constitution. This conclusion is apparently based on the suprem-
acy clause of the federal constitution. That clause reads: "This Constitution . . . shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Court's citation of Moe is interesting because Moe did not involve 
9
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Court concluded that House Bill No. 1454 would, if enacted, establish a 
religion in violation of the first amendment; consequently, the Court did 
not discuss the viability of the legislation under article II, part 1.'0 The 
Court did state, however, that the criteria established by the United 
States Supreme Court for adjudicating first amendment claims are 
"equally appropriate" for judging claims under analogous sections of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, thereby suggesting that the standards under 
the federal and state provisions are precisely the same." 
In its analysis of the federal constitutional issue, the Court relied 
heavily on its recent and principal school prayer decision, Kent v. Com-
missioner of Education, 12 in which it concluded that a prior version of 
chapter 71, section lA violated the establishment clause of the first 
amendment. 13 When the Court compared the language in House Bill No. 
a situation where the Court, after finding a Massachusetts statute in violation of the federal 
constitution, refused to address a state constitutional issue. Rather, the Court in Moe held 
that the so-called Doyle-Flynn amendment, which limited public funding of abortions only to 
those necessary to save the life of the mother, was unconstitutional under the due process 
guarantees of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 480, 417 
N.E.2d at 397. The Moe Court reached this result despite the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court had previously upheld virtually identical restrictions regarding the funding of 
abortions passed by the United States Congress and by another state legislature. See Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 597 (1980); Williams v. Zbaraj, 448 U.S. 358 (1980). Moe therefore 
demonstrates that an individual may receive more protection under a state constitution than 
under the cognate provision of the federal counterpart. See Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United 
States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 887 (1980). 
With regard to this supremacy clause question, reference should also be made to Widmar 
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, a state university adopted a regulation prohibit-
ing use of its facilities for religious purposes. [d. at 265. The facilities were othelWise 
available to registered student groups. [d. A student religious organization, deprived of the 
use of university meeting rooms, argued that this deprivation violated the first and four-
teenth amendments. [d. at 266. The university asserted that its regulation was required by 
the establishment clause of the first amendment and also by a cognate provision of the state 
constitution. [d. at 270,275. The Supreme Court struck down the regulation on the grounds 
that it implicated first amendment free speech and association rights. [d. at 273 n.13, 277. 
The Supreme Court further demonstrated that the regulation did not run afoul of the 
establishment clause. [d. at 271-73. With regard to the state constitutional issue, the Su-
preme Court noted that the state court had not ruled whether such a regulation would violate 
the state constitution. /d. at 275. Therefore, the Supreme Court refused to determine how 
the state court would decide that issue. /d. The Supreme Court went on to note "[ilt is also 
unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, a state interest, derived 
from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free speech rights protected by the First 
Amendment." [d. at 275-76. 
10 387 Mass. at 1207, 440 N.E.2d at 1163. 
II [d. at 1202, 440 N.E.2d at 1160 (quoting Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 378 
Mass. 550, 558, 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (1979». 
12 380 Mass. 235, 402 N.E.2d 1349 (1980). 
13 [d. at 245, 402 N.E.2d at 1345. The version of section lA examined in Kent read as 
follows: 
10
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1454 with the version of section lA which it had examined in Kent, it 
found no significant difference. 14 The version of section lA examined in 
Kent had provided that a student volunteer could offer a period of 
prayer. IS House Bill No. 1454, on the other hand, permitted a student 
volunteer to offer a period of prayer or meditation. 16 The Court, however, 
considered the addition of the words "or meditation" in House Bill No. 
1454 to be of no constitutional significance. The Court explained that even 
though prayer was not the exclusive aim of House Bill 1454, it neverthe-
less contemplated that, at least on some occasions, prayer would be 
offered. 17 The Court considered this element of the proposed legislation 
sufficient to invoke the establishment clause, stating that the "United 
States Supreme Court . . . has consistently held that the Establishment 
Clause withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief or the 
expression thereof. "18 
As in Kent, the Court applied the criteria for adjudicating freedom of 
religion claims which the Supreme Court established in School District of 
Abington Township v. Schempp.19 The Schempp test provides that if 
either the purpose or principal effect of the legislation is to advance or 
inhibit religion, then the enactment is beyond the scope of legislative 
power. 20 In other words, in order to withstand scrutiny under the estab-
lishment clause, "there must be a secular legislative purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. "21 According to 
the Supreme Judicial Court, the purpose of House Bill No. 1454 was to 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools 
the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce that 
a period of prayer may be offered by a student volunteer, and during any such period 
an excusal provision will be allowed for those students who do not wish to partici-
pate. 
14 387 Mass. 1204, 440 N.E.2d at 1161. 
15Id. 
16Id. 
17Id. 
18 Id. (quoting School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963». 
19 374 U.S. 203 (1%3). In Schempp the Supreme Court struck down, as violative of the 
establishment clause, state laws requiring reading of the Bible in the public schools. 
20 Id. at 222. 
21 Id. Later Supreme Court establishment clause cases have recognized a third prong to 
the test, namely, avoidance of "excessive government entanglement with religion." Widmar 
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 264, 271 (1981); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In 
Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General, the Supreme Judicial Court stated "indeed, there 
is a 'significant fourth factor' implicit in the analysis [that] the [United States Supreme] 
Court has undertaken - that is, whether the challenged practice has a 'divisive political 
potential.' " 378 Mass. 550,558,392 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (1979) (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 
421 U.S. 349,374 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part». In Opinion 
of the Justices, the Court only referred to the first two prongs of the test. 387 Mass. at 1205, 
440 N.E.2d at 1161. 
11
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encourage the recitation of prayer and its primary effect was to return 
prayer,22 necessarily a religious exercise,23 to the classroom. 24 As stated 
by the Court, both in this case and in Kent, "it [would be] more than a 
strain to argue that religion [was] not being advanced . . . ." 25 
Although a majority of the Court found House Bill No. 1454 constitu-
tionally offensive after examining the purpose and primary effect of the 
proposed legislation,26 perhaps the majority should have explained more 
clearly why the presence ofthe phrase "or meditation" apparently had no 
impact.27 As noted above, that phrase indicated clearly that prayer was 
not the only aim ofthe bill.28 In Gaines v. Anderson 29 a three judge panel 
of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
examined, and upheld, an earlier version of chapter 71, section lA of the 
General Laws which provided that "a period of silence . . . shall be 
observed for meditation or prayer .... ' '30 In analyzing that version of 
section lA3I the Gaines court examined independently the words "medi-
tation" and "or prayer." Meditation, the district court noted, unlike 
22 387 Mass. at 1206, 440 N.E.2d at 1162. 
23 [d. In Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337, 343 (D. Mass. 1976) the federal district 
court noted that prayer usually "has a specially religious meaning." In Kent v. Commis-
sioner of Education, 380 Mass. 235, 238, 402 N.E.2d 1240, 1341-42 (1980), the Supreme 
Judicial Court referred to prayer as a serious invocation of the deity, an exercise which is 
intrinsically religious. This is so even when the aim of the prayer is secular. As noted in 
Kent: 
The question is not what a suppliant asks but to whom he addresses his supplication. 
The religious aspect is evident where the prayer is sectarian, or devotional without 
being sectarian; it seems to us not less evident when the suppliant seeks a secular 
result for he is still addressing himself to the Deity, to Whom he often also offers 
praise and thanks. 
380 Mass. at 242, 402 N.E.2d at 134<+. 
24 387 Mass. at 1205,440 N.E.2d at 1162. 
2S [d. (quoting Kent v. Commissioner of Education, 380 Mass. 235, 243, 402 N.E.2d at 
1340, 1345 (1980». 
26 387 Mass. at 1205, 440 N.E.2d at 1162. 
27 In Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976) the federal district court 
analyzed, in detail, a prior version of chapter 71, section lA which contained the words 
"meditation or prayer." The only reference to Gaines in Opinion of the Justices is in a 
footnote. 387 Mass. at 1204 n.3, 440 N.E.2d at 1161 n.3. 
28 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
29 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976). 
30 [d. at 346. 
31 G.L. c. 71, § lA, as examined in Gaines, provided: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools 
the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce that 
a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for 
meditation and during any such period silence shall be maintained and no activities 
engaged in. 
12
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prayer, is secular.32 Providing students with an opportunity to meditate, 
the district court continued, was consistent with a secular goal of public 
education, namely, that of "encourag[ing] students to turn their minds 
silently toward serious thoughts and values. "33 Prayer, on the other hand, 
the district court observed, has a peculiarly religious connotation. 34 The 
court in Gaines concluded that the Commonwealth was making available 
to students an opportunity to engage in prayer, albeit silent prayer. 35 
Nevertheless, the district court upheld the enactment. 36 In examining the 
history connected with the addition of the words "or prayer" to section 
lA, the Gaines court considered it significant that the legislature used the 
word "or" and not "and."37 According to the district court, intentional 
use of the disjunctive "indicat[ed] a legislative sensitivity to the First 
Amendment's mandate to take a neutral position that neither encourges 
nor discourages prayer."38 The effect of the statute, as determined in 
Gaines, was to "accommodate students who desire to use the minute of 
silence for prayer or religious meditation, and also other students who 
prefer to reflect upon secular matters. "39 
Both the version of section lA examined in Gaines and House Bill No. 
1454 used the words "prayer or meditation. "40 The former statute was 
upheld, however, while the latter was found constitutionally defective. 41 
It is difficult to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory results. One 
possible distinction is that the prayer permitted under the Gaines version 
of IA is silent while the invocations contemplated under House Bill No. 
1454 would be oral. This difference, however, does not provide an ade-
quate basis for distinguishing the views of the Supreme Judicial Court 
32 Id. at 342. "Used in its ordinary sense, 'meditation' connotes serious reflection or 
contemplation as a subject which may be religious, irreligious or nonreligious." Id. 
33 421 F. Supp. at 342. 
34 /d. at 343. 
35 /d. at 344-45. 
36 /d. at 346. 
37 Chapter 621 of the Acts of 1973 inserted the words "or prayer." The bill as originally 
drafted used the words "and prayer." See House Bill No. 4890 (1973). The bill's sponsor, 
however, later amended it by deleting "and" and inserting "or." 421 F. Supp. at 343. The 
federal district court felt that this action evidenced the neutrality required of the state by the 
establishment clause. Id. The only act commanded by the state pursuant to section lA 
according to the Gaines court was that the students remain quiet for a minute during which 
they could pray or meditate. The district court found it significant that "there [was] no 
command that they meditate or pray." Id. at 344. 
38 421 F. Supp. at 343. 
39 Id. 
40 See supra text accompanying note 4 arid note 31. 
41 Compare supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text with notes 9-25 and accompanying 
text. 
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from those of the federal district court in Gaines. As noted in Gaines, "if 
the amendment here [which permits silent prayer] has the purpose or 
primary effect of encouraging the religious activity of prayer the statute 
would be rendered unconstitutional.' '42 Conversely, not every oral recita-
tion of prayer sanctioned by the state is unconstitutional. 43 The element of 
silence, therefore, cannot be the sole distinguishing feature. Perhaps a 
secular purpose and primary effect that neither discourages nor advances 
religion is merely easier to ascertain when the prayer authorized by the 
state must be done in silence. Certainly, it would have been helpful if the 
Supreme Judicial Court had more carefully distinguished House Bill No. 
1454 from the version of section lA examined in Gaines. 
The Court also commented on Section B of House Bill No. 1454.44 As 
noted above, Section B analogized school prayer exercises to legislative 
prayer exercises, and concluded that because the latter does not offend 
the constitution, neither does the former. 45 The Court was quick to point 
out that this provision violated the principle of separation of powers.46 
Citing Marbury v. Madison,47 the majority noted that it is the duty of the 
judiciary, and not the legislature, to determine when legislation con-
travenes the Constitution.48 Moreover, the court reasoned, the attempt to 
equate the two forms of prayer exercise was unsound. 49 
The analogy ofthe two prayer exercises in Bill No. 1454 was an obvious 
reference to Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General. 50 In Colo the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that a Massachusetts statute which permitted 
public funds to be used to pay the salaries of Senate and House of 
Representatives chaplains violated neither the Massachusetts nor the 
42 421 F. Supp. at 343. 
43 See, e.g., Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E.2d 1195 
(1979) (legislative prayer exercises offered by legislative chaplains prior to each day's 
session do not violate establishment clause.) 
44 387 Mass. at 1205-06, 440 N.E.2d at 1162. For the text of Section B see supra text 
accompanying note 4. 
45 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
46 Id. at 1206, 440 N .E.2d at 1162. The principle of separation of powers is embodied in 
MASS. CONST. part I, art. XXX which provides: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never 
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall 
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall 
never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it 
may be a government of laws and not of men. 
47 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
48 387 Mass. at 1206, 440 N.E.2d at 1162. 
49Id. 
so 378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E.2d 1195 (1979). 
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federal constitutions. 51 Further, albeit in dicta, the Colo Court indicated 
that the chaplains' practice of offering invocations prior to each day's 
legislative session was constitutional. 52 In explaining why this practice 
was permissible, the Colo Court sought to distinguish it from public 
school prayer exercises. 53 As justification for its rejection of the analogy 
between school and legislative prayer exercises contained in House Bill 
No. 1454, the Court quoted the following passage from its Colo decision: 
The State, by incorporating religious exercises into the context of a compul-
sory school day, lends at least implicit support to the notion that children 
should be indoctrinated to accept religion. The purpose of school is to teach 
impressionable children, many of whom, because of their ages, cannot be 
expected to comprehend that school sponsored prayers are not necessarily 
'lessons' to be learned like other aspects of the school programs .... By 
contrast, mature legislators may reasonably be assumed to have fully 
formed their own religious beliefs or non beliefs. The provision of a ceremo-
nial moment of meditation at the opening of the legislative session is unlikely 
to advance religious belief either among the legislators or their constituency, 
even if it does give recognition to the traditional place that prayer has 
occupied in such a ritual for two centuries. 54 
Despite the extensive quotation from Colo, it would have been helpful if 
the majority isolated and elaborated on the factors that permit prayer to 
be recited in the legislative context yet forbid it in the schoolroom. This is 
particularly so since the two dissenting justices predicated their dissent on 
the constitutionality of legislative prayer exercises under Colo. 55 For 
example, the significance of the potential for prayer to be confused with 
the usual curriculum, and thus viewed as mandatory by students, is 
unclear. Indeed, in Kent the parties stipulated that this risk was not even 
an issue.56 Furthermore, assuming that prayer is indeed more ceremonial 
in the legislative context than in the classroom, such a distinction is of 
dubious value in deciding the constitutional issue presented by public 
prayer. Regardless of the setting and the degree of ceremony or ritual, 
prayer is an innately religious act. 57 Another question left unanswered is 
the significance, if any, of age, particularly in light of the fact that the 
prohibition of school prayer affects high school as well as grade school 
students. The Court's argument regarding the impressionability of stu-
dents is much less persuasive at the secondary school level. 
51 [d. at 561,392 N.E.2d at 1201. G.L. c. 3, § 14 provides that "the chaplain of the senate 
and the chaplain of the house of representatives shall each receive such salary as may be 
established by the [respective] committee[s] on rules .... " 
52 378 Mass. at 558-60, 392 N.E.2d at 1200-01. 
53 [d. at 559, 392 N.E.2d at 1200. 
54 387 Mass. at 1206, 440 N.E.2d at 1162 (quoting Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver 
General, 378 Mass. 550, 553, 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (1978». 
55Id. at 1207-08,440 N.E.2d at 1163. 
56 380 Mass. at 238, 402 N.E.2d at 1341. 
57 See supra note 23. 
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Dissenting Justices Nolan and Lynch asserted that Colo was indistin-
guishable from the case before the Court and, indeed, that it supported a 
conclusion that House Bill ~o. 1454 was constitutional. 58 Quoting from 
Colo, Justice Nolan stated: 
There is no evidence that a great degree of government entanglement with 
religion is occasioned by the employment of legislative chaplains, [substi-
tute "student volunteers"]. The prayers offered are brief, the content un-
supervised by the state, and attendance completely voluntary. There is no 
evidence that the State has become embroiled in any difficult decisions 
about which religions are to be represented or what sorts of invocation are 
to be offered. 59 
Just as it would have aided analysis if the majority articulated more 
definitively the factors distinguishing legislative prayer and school prayer, 
it would have been helpful if Justice Nolan explained why Kent 60 was not 
the controlling decision, and further, what impact a favorable decision in 
this case would have had on Kent. 
§ 9.3. Governor's Authority to Recall General Court - Political Question 
Doctrine. On November 2, 1982, Massachusetts voters approved a legisla-
tive amendment! to their constitution authorizing the General Court to 
reinstate capital punishment as a criminal sanction in the Commonwealth. 2 
58 387 Mass. at 1207-08, 440 N.E.2d at 1163. 
59 Jd. 
60 380 Mass. 234, 402 N .E.2d 1340 (1980). See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
§ 9.3. I Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution notes a distinction between legisla-
tive and initiative amendments to the constitution. It provides: "a proposal for amendment to 
the constitution introduced into the General Court by initiative petition shall be designated an 
initiative amendment, and an amendment introduced by a member of either house shall be 
designated a legislative substitute or a legislative amendment." MASS. CONST. art. 48, The 
Initiative, part IV, § 1. 
Article 48, which wa~ added to the constitution in 1918, provides generally for procedures 
surrounding the initiative and the referendum. These are defined as follows: 
Legislative power shall continue to be vested in the General Court; but the people 
reserve to themselves the popular initiative, which is the power of a specified number of 
voters to submit constitutional amendments and laws to the people for approval or 
rejection; and the popular referendum, which is the power of a specified number of 
voters to submit laws, enacted by the General Court, to the people for their ratification 
or rejection. 
MASS. CONST. art. 48, part I, Definition. 
2 MASS. CONST. art. 116. Article 116 amended article 26 of the Declaration of Rights by 
adding the last two sentences. Article 26 now reads as follows: 
No magistrate or court of law, shall demand excessive bailor sureties, impose excessive 
fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments. No provision of the Constitution, how-
ever, shall be construed as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of death. The 
General Court may, for the purpose of protecting the general welfare of the citizens, 
authorize the imposition of the punishment of death by the courts of law having 
jurisdiction of crimes subject to the punishment of death. 
16
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A prerequisite to the electorate's consideration of this amendment, how-
ever, was approval by a majority of two successive joint sessions of the 
Legislature. InBackman v. Secretary of the Commonwealth 3 the Supreme 
Judicial Court examined the validity of the method used by Governor King 
to convene the General Court into joint constitutional session to consider 
the capital punishment amendment. Additionally, the Court in Backman 
discussed the application of the federal political question doctrine to Mas-
sachusetts jurisprudence. 4 
The Massachusetts Constitution requires that before a proposed legisla-
tive amendment to the constitution can be submitted to the people at the 
general election, it must be approved at two successive terms of the 
General Court, by a majority of the members of that body, meeting in joint 
session.s In May 1980, the Senate and House of Representatives assembled 
in joint session to consider, among other items, the proposed capital pun-
ishment amendment. 6 On July 2, 1980, the General Court )ldjourned prior 
to taking final action on this amendment. 7 Three days later, Governor 
King, acting at the request of the Legislature and with the advice and 
consent of the Executive Council, prorogued the General Court until "the 
day preceding the first Wednesday ofJanuary, 1981."8 On September 10, 
1980, Governor King notified the Executive Council that he wished to 
convene the General Court into joint session so that it might resume 
MASS. CONST. part I, art. 26. In 1980, prior to the amendment of article 26, the Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that the death penalty violated that article's prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment. District Attorney for Suffolk District v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648,671, 
411 N .E.2d 1274, 1283 (1980). 
3 387 Mass. 549, 441 N.E.2d 523 (1982). 
4 Id. at 55455, 441 N.E.2d at 526-27. 
5 MASS. CONST. art. 48, The Initiative, part IV, § 4. Section 4 provides that: "[a]t such 
joint session a legislative amendment receiving the affirmative votes for a majority of all the 
members elected, or an initiative amendment receiving the affirmative votes of not less than 
one-fourth of all the members elected, shall be referred to the next General Court." /d. 
Section 5 of part IV provides: 
If in the next General Court a legislative amendment shall again be agreed to in joint 
session by a majority of all the members elected ... such fact shall be certified by the 
clerk of such joint session to the secretary of the commonwealth, who shall submit the 
amendment to the people at the next state election. Such amendment shall become 
part of the constitution if approved . . . . 
MASS. CONST. art. 48, The Initiative, part IV, § 5. 
6 387 Mass. at 551, 441 N.E.2d at 524. 
7Id. 
S /d. The Governor, in essence, prorogued the General Court through the remainder of its 
regular session. The constitution provides that "[t]he General Court shall assembie every 
year on the first Wednesday in January." MASS. CONST. art. 64, § 3. In addition, the 
constitution also provides that the General Court's year shall begin on the first Wednesday of 
January. MASS. CONST. art. 10. See infra note 55. 
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deliberation on the capital punishment amendment.9 One week later, the 
Executive Council consented to the Governer's request. IO The Governor 
thereupon issued a proclamation calling "the members of the General 
Court ... to assemble ... September 18, 1980 ... in continuance of joint 
constitutional session, which adjourned on July 2, 1980, to the end that final 
action may be taken upon all proposals for Constitutional Amendments 
properly before it. "11 
Shortly after the General Court convened, Senator Jack Backman raised 
a point of order challenging the Governor's authority to directly reconvene 
the Legislature after its adjournment and subsequent prorogation.12 The 
President of the Senate ruled Senator Backman's challenge out of order. 13 
Shortly thereafter the Senator initiated an action in the Supreme Judicial 
Court.14 Because the proposed amendment had yet to be approved by two 
terms of the General Court, as required under the constitution,15 the 
Supreme Judicial Court took no action on the merits at that time. 16 The 
amendment subsequently received a favorable vote from a majority of the 
members of the General Court both at the September 1980 joint session and 
at a joint session convened in May of 1982.1' On August 4, 1982, the Court 
heard arguments on the case and two days later, having found no impropri-
ety in the manner in which the General Court convened in September 1980, 
ruled that the capital punishment amendment should be submitted to the 
people. IS On November 1, 1982, the Court issued its written opinion. 
Senator Backman argued that Governor King was without authority to 
convene the General Court into joint session without first assembling it as a 
legislature.l9 The first affirmation of the proposed amendment by the 
members of the General Court was therefore defective, the Senator as-
9 387 Mass. at 551, 441 N.E.2d at 525. 
I°Id. 
11 Id. The proclamation also made reference to the Governor's power to recall the 
General Court after it has been prorogued. This power is contained in MASS. CONST. part II, 
ch. 2, § 1, art. 5. 
12 387 Mass. at 552, 441 N.E.2d at 526. Senator Backman also raised a second point of 
order with respect to the Governor's proclamation. Id. at 553, 441 N.E.2d at 526. He argued 
that the Governor violated the principle of separation of powers in that his proclamation 
restricted legislative action to consideration of proposed constitutional amendments. Id. 
Because the Legislature never endeavored to transact any other business, the court refused 
to consider this issue. Id. 
13 Id. at 552, 441 N.E.2d at 526. 
14 Id. at 553, 441 N.E.2d at 526. Presumably Senator Backman was seeking declaratory 
relief. See G.L. c. 231A, § 1 (authorizing the Supreme Judicial Court to issue declaratory 
judgments). 
15 MASS. CONST. art. 48, The Initiative, part IV, §§ 4, 5. See supra note 5. 
16 387 Mass. at 553, 441 N.E.2d at 526. 
17Id. 
18 Id. at 550, 441 N.E.2d at 524. 
19 Id. at 550, 552, 441 N.E.2d at 525, 526. 
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serted, and consequently the amendment could not properly be submitted 
to the people at the November 2 election. 20 Although article V of the 
Massachusetts Constitution permits the Governor to recall the legislature 
"sooner than the time to which it may be ... prorogued, if the Welfare of 
the Commonwealth shall [so] require," 21 that provision, according to 
Senator Backman, contemplates a recall of the General Court as a legisla-
ture,zz The Senator argued that article V does not authorize the Governor 
to convene the General Court into joint session, and indeed, it does not 
even address the question of joint session.23 Senator Backman observed 
that a separate provision in the constitution does speak specifically to that 
issue. 24 He noted that article 48, as amended by article 81, provides that "if 
the two houses fail to agree upon a time for holding any joint session ... or 
fail to continue the same from time to time until final action has been taken 
upon all amendments pending, the Governor shall call such joint session or 
continuance thereof. "25 This provision, Senator Backman maintained, 
presupposes that both houses already are assembled as a legislature prior to 
being convened into joint session.26 
The Secretary of the Commonwealth, on the other hand, urged the Court 
not to review the matter at all on the ground that it involved a political 
question,21 The Court's opinion does not detail the precise arguments 
20 [d. at 550, 441 N.E.2d at 525; see MASS. CONST~ art. 48, The Initiative, part IV, § 5. See 
supra note 5. 
21 MASS. CONST. part 2, ch. 5, § 1, art. V. Article V provides in part: 
[d. 
The Governor, with advice of Council, shall have full power and authority, during the 
Session of the General Court to adjourn or prorogue the same to any time the two 
houses shall desire; ... and, in the recess of the said Court, to prorogue the same 
from time to time, not exceeding ninety days in anyone recess; and to call it together 
sooner than the time to which it may be adjourned or prorogued if the welfare of the 
Commonwealth shall require the same .... 
22 387 Mass. at 550, 555, 441 N.E.2d at 525, 527. 
23 [d. 
24 See MASS. CONST. art. 81, § 1. Section 2, which amended art. 48, The Initiative, part 
IV, § 2, provides in pertinent part: 
[d. 
[l]n case of a proposal for amendment introduced into the general court by a member 
of either house, consideration thereof in joint session is called for by vote of either 
house, such proposal shall, not later than the second Wednesday in May, be laid 
before a joint session of the two houses, at which the president of the senate shall 
preside; and if the two houses fail to agree upon a time for holding any joint session 
hereby required, or fail to continue the same from time to time until final action has 
been taken upon all amendments pending, the Governor shall call such joint session 
or continuance thereof. 
B [d. 
26 387 Mass. at 550, 555, 441 N.E.2d at 525, 527. 
27 [d. at 354, 441 N.E.2d at 526. See infra note 28 (discussion of the political question 
doctrine as articulated by the federal courts). The Secretary argued, in the alternative, that 
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advanced in support of this assertion. 28 Perhaps, however, the Secretary 
the General Court convened itself.ld. at 556, 441 N.E.2d at 528. Presumably the Secretary 
was referring to the General Court's power to self assembly contained in article 10 of the 
Massachusetts Constitution. See infra note 55. The Supreme Judicial Court indicated, 
however, that the General Court had not properly convened itself. 387 Mass. at 556, 441 
N.E.2d at 528 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 664, 675, 22 N.E.2d 261,269 (1939); 
Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 623, 626-27, 3 N.E.2d 218,220-21 (1936». See infra note 
54. 
28 See 387 Mass. at 554, 441 N.E.2d at 526-27. Although the political question doctrine is 
well established in the federal courts, the ingredients of the doctrine are not always appar-
ent. There are, however, three fairly distinct strands of that doctrine. The most prominent 
among them is the so-called commitment strand, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
- CASES AND MATERIALS 449-50, 1688-90 (1Oth ed. 1979), which provides that a court may 
refuse to review a case where it perceives that the constitution envisions resolution of the 
issue by a branch other than the judiciary. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). The 
second strand emphasizes the court's competence, or more aptly, the lack thereof, to 
adjudicate that particular type of question. The third strand of the doctrine is grounded on 
judicial discretion. Some issues may be excessively controversial, or may result in difficul-
ties of enforcement of judgment, or may result in different pronouncements by different 
branches ofthe government so as to warrant the court to decline review. See G. GUNTHER, 
supra, at 1688-89. It has been suggested that the first strand presents the only legitimate 
reason for a court to refuse to adjudicate a case. We schIer, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7, 9 (1963). Certainly it would seem that if the 
Constitution envisions resolution of an issue by the legislature or executive, then, pursuant 
to the separation of powers doctrine, the court ought not to review it. 
One ofthe political question cases cited by the Backman majority, Baker v. Carr, contains 
a good description of the ingredients of a political question. As noted by Justice' Brennan: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in 
which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or 
more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment for multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). In Baker v. Carr the Supreme Court considered whether the issue 
of state legislative reapportionment was justiciable, that is, whether it constituted a political 
question. Id. at 209. The State argued that the issue implicated the Guaranty Clause of the 
federal Constitution, and was therefore a political question. The Supreme Court responded: 
We hold that the claim pleaded here neither rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty 
Clause and that its justiciabilitJ! is therefore not foreclosed by. our decisions of cases 
involving that clause . . . . To show why we reject the argument based on the 
Guaranty Clause, we must examine the authorities under it .... That review reveals 
that in the Guaranty Clause cases and in other "political questions" cases, it is the 
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Gov-
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contended that the state constitution envisioned that the manner in which 
the houses are assembled into joint session was an issue for the Governor 
alone to resolve, or, alternatively, for the Governor and the General Court 
to resolve in concert. 29 The Court, however, declined the Secretary's 
invitation, noting that it has consistently refused to incorporate the political 
question doctrine into Massachusetts jurisprudence.3o 
ernment, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to 
the "political question." 
Id. at 209-10. 
In addition to Baker v. Carr, the Backman majority cited two other United States Supreme 
Court decisions which addressed the political question doctrine. In Powell v. McCormack 
the Supreme Court determined that Congressman Adam Clayton Powell had been improp-
erly excluded from the House of Representatives after his constituents duly elected him. 
395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969). Powell was excluded pursuant to a House Resolution which was 
predicated on improprieties which Powell committed during a prior term of Congress. Id. at 
490-93. The Supreme Court was urged not to review the case on the ground, that it involved 
a political question, namely, that the House should be the body to decide what persons were 
qualified to be members.Id. at 518-20. The Supreme Court concluded that the question was 
justiciable and that, at most, the Constitution committed to the House the duty to determine 
whether the person met the article I, section 5 standing qualifications of age, residency, and 
citizenship.Id. at 548. Because the House committee investigating the matter had concluded 
that Powell satisfied these qualifications, the Supreme Court concluded that it was improper 
to deny him his seat. Jd. at 492, 550. 
The majority in Backman also cited Goldwater v. Carter to support its position that it did 
not have a political question before it. 387 Mass. at 554,441 N.E.2d at 526. In Goldwater v. 
Carter a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that it should not decide whether the 
President, acting without the advice and consent of Congress, could terminate a treaty. 444 
U.S. 996, 997, 1006 (1979). Only four of the justices, however, so ruled on grounds of the 
political question doctrine. Jd. at 1002-06. 
Another political question case not noted by the majority, but commented on by Justice 
Liacos in dissent, is United States v. Nixon, 387 Mass. at 558, 441 N.E.2d at 529 (Liacos, J., 
dissenting). In that case, President Nixon argued that the determination of the existence of 
executive privilege was an issue to be decided by the executive and not by the courts. 418 
U.S. 683,693,783 (1974). The Supreme Court disagreed.Id. at 704-05. It concluded that, 
with the possible exception of national security matters, there is no absolute executive 
privilege. Id. at 706. 
Certainly these cases suggest, as both the majority and dissent noted in the instant case, 
that the political question doctrine is on the decline. See Henken, Is There a "Political 
Question Doctrine?", 85 YALE L.J. 597,597-617 (1976); see generally J. NOWAK, 
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-20 (2d ed. 1983); B. SCHWARTZ, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40-43 (1979). 
29 Presumably the basis for the Secretary's assertion was that the manner in which the 
Governor should assemble the General Court into joint session after it has been prorogued is 
a question not to be resolved by the courts, as envisioned by the commitment strand of the 
political question doctrine. See supra note 28 (discussing political question doctrine). 
30 387 Mass. at 554, 441 N.E.2d at 526-27. See supra note 28. As examples of Massachu-
setts decisions refusing to apply the political question doctrine the court cited Moe v. 
Secretary of Administration and Finance, 382 Mass. 629,417 N.E.2d 387 (1981) and Colo v. 
Treasurer and Receiver General, 378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E.2d 1195 (1979). In Moe the 
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Although the court formally refused to treat the Backman case as nonjus-
ticiable, its degree of review appears minimal. For example, the majority 
stated: 
We conclude that there is no explicit or necessarily implicit constitutional 
provision directing the manner in which the Governor shall call the General 
Court into joint session and that, in the circumstances, where the members of 
the General Court in joint session accepted the Governor's call and the joint 
session acted on various matters, this court should not disturb the procedure 
adopted by the Governor and accepted by the Legislature.31 
In these circumstances, mindful of the principle of separation of powers so 
carefully stated in art[icle] 30 of the Declaration of Rights, this court 
should not infer specific constitutional procedures that the executive and 
legislative branches of government must follow. No constitutional require-
Supreme Judicial Court considered whether the so-called Doyle-Flynn amendments, which 
limited public funding of abortions to those necessary to save the life of the mother, violated 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 382 Mass. at 646, 417 N .E.2d at 397. The Secretary 
of Administration and Finance argued that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The 
Secretary contended that because the Doyle-Flynn amendments were appropriation mea-
sures, adjudication of the case would implicate the separation of powers and political 
question doctrines. Id. The Court rejected this argument for several reasons. First, the 
legislature already had appropriated the funds, and therefore the Court itself appropriated 
nothing. Second, regardless of how the Court resolved the issue, its action would not cause 
any additional expenditures; indeed, a decision striking down the legislation conceivably 
would result in fewer expenditures since the medical costs of childbirth tend to be higher 
than those of abortion. Third, simply because legislative action involves appropriations, that 
action is not necessarily insulated from judicial review.ld. at 641-42, 417 N.E.2d at 395. It is 
interesting to note that neither the Secretary nor the Court distinguished jurisdiction from 
justiciability. Rather, the Secretary argued that because the question was political, the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.ld. at 641, 417 N.E.2d at 395. The United States Supreme 
Court, however, has stated: 
As we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1%2), there is a significant 
difference between determining whether afederal court has jurisdiction of the subject 
matter and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is "justiciable.". . . [T]he doctrine of separation of powers is more 
properly considered in determining whether the case is "justiciable." 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512 (1%9). In Powell the Supreme Court again noted 
that the political question doctrine is really one aspect of the larger separation of powers 
principle. Id. at 518. 
The Backman court also cited Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General as an example of a 
case rejecting application of the political question doctrine. 387 Mass. at 554,441 N.E.2d at 
526-27. In Colo the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether a statute which authorized 
use of public funds to pay salaries of legislative chaplains violated the establishment clause 
of the first amendment. 378 Mass. 550, 558, 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (1979). Because the 
Massachusetts Constitution permits the Legislature to adopt its own rules of procedure, and 
because the Treasurer and Receiver General assumed that the hiring of a chaplain was an 
internal procedure, the defendant contended that the case was nonjusticiable.ld. at 553, 392 
N .E.2d at 1197. The Court rejected this argument, noting that it was the duty of the judiciary 
to determine whether a particular action conflicted with the constitution. Id. 
31 387 Mass. at 550-51, 441 N.E.2d at 525. 
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ment was violated. The Governor and the General Court could have rea-
sonably concluded that the General Court had been properly recalled and 
called into joint constitutional session.32 
Indeed, Justice Liacos, in dissent, commented: "[T]he approach taken 
[by the majority] is reminiscent of [the] ... approach" taken by the 
federal courts in a political question case.33 
Although the Court refused to find the manner in which the General 
Court reconvened defective,34 the reasoning behind its decision is not 
clear. Perhaps it was because the Court concluded that the constitution in 
fact authorizes the Governor to reassemble the General Court into joint 
session without first convening it as a legislature. While silent as to method 
and time, the constitution certainly empowers the Governor to convene 
both houses into joint session.35 The Court itself stated that the constitution 
contains no "explicit or necessarily implicit ... provision directing the 
manner in which the Governor shall call the General Court into joint 
session. "36 
Alternatively, it is possible that the reason the Court upheld the proce-
dure was its conclusion that the Governor, for all intents and purposes, 
issued two proclamations, each predicated on a clearly conferred constitu-
tional power.37 As noted by the Court: 
Although the plaintiff argues that his challenge is not merely one of form, the 
fact remains that his challenge would lose its force if the Governor had issued 
two proclamations - one recalling the General Court and the second calling 
the General Court into joint constitutional session. We believe that the two 
steps can appropriately be carried out in one document.38 
The likelihood that this reasoning formed the basis for the Court's decision 
is diminished, however, by another portion of the opinion where the ma-
jority stated that Senator Backman "neither argues nor concedes the point 
that, after prorogation of the General Court, the Governor lacked constitu-
tional authority to recall the General Court and then to call a joint constitu-
tional session. We do not pass on [that] point. 39 The Court later com-
mented that if the question were presented as to "whether, after proroga-
tion of the Legislature, the Governor had the power to recall it and then 
convene a joint constitutional session, we would treat that question as one 
appropriate for consideration in a law suit . . . challenging any purported 
final action of the recommended joint session. "40 
32 ld. at 555, 441 N.E.2d at 527. 
33 ld. at 557, 441 N.E.2d at 528 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
341d. at 555-56, 441 N.E.2d at 527. 
3S See MASS. CONST. art. 81, amending MASS. CONST. art. 48, The Initiative, part IV, § 2. 
See supra note 24. 
36 387 Mass. at 550, 441 N.E.2d at 525. 
37 ld. at 555, 441 N .E.2d at 527. 
38 ld. at 555-56, 441 N.E.2d at 527. 
39 ld. at 552, 441 N.E.2d at 526. 
40 ld. at 555, 441 N.E.2d at 527. 
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Finally, it is possible the court's reason for upholding the Governor's 
action was really grounded on a combination of factors - namely, the lack 
of specificity in the constitution regarding the manner in which the General 
Court, after prorogation, is to be assembled into joint session, and the 
assumption by both the General Court and the Govenor that the General 
Court had been properly recalled. As noted above, the majority on two 
occasions referred to the General Court's acquiescence in the matter.41 
This last suggestion seems to supply the best answer. The constitution 
explicitly allows the Governor to recall the General Court and to assemble 
both houses into joint session.42 It is simply unclear how that undeniably 
permissible end is to be accomplished subsequent to the legislature's pro~ 
gation. The Governor's proclamation cited his authority to recall both 
houses,43 and both the Governor and the General Court, as a body, appar-
entlybelieved that the recall had been achieved properly.44 Aware of these 
factors, and mindful of the separation of powers principle,4s the Court itself 
seemed willing to defer to the judgment of the Governor and the General 
Court.46 Of course, if that in fact is an accurate explanation of the Court's 
decision, then the case does resemble a political question case. The minimal 
review exercised by the Backman court is surprising in light of statements 
in prior Supreme Judicial Court decisions suggesting that the amendment 
process calls for careful scrutiny.47 Indeed, Justice Liacos was particularly 
critical of the majority for approaching the case in this manner which, in his 
perception, was clearly at odds with the manner in which the Court had 
analyzed prior proposed constitutional amendment cases.48 
4\ Id. at 550-51,555,441 N.E.2d at 525,527. See supra text accompanying notes 31 and 
32. 
42 MASS. CONST. part II, ch. 2, § 1, art. 5. Article 5 authorizes the Governor to recall the 
General Court after it has been prorogued. See supra note 21. Article 81 authorizes the 
Governor to convene the General Court into joint constitutional session. MASS. CONST. art. 
81, amending MASS. CONST. art. 48, The Initiative, part IV, § 2. See supra note 24. 
43 387 Mass. at 551 n.3, 441 N.E.2d at 525 n.3. The proclamation referred to the Gover-
nor's authority conferred under MASS. CONST. part II, ch. 2, § 1, art 5. See supra notes 1I 
and 21. 
44 387 Mass. at 555, 441 N.E.2d at 527. 
4S MASS. CONST. part I, art. 30. Article 30 provides: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never 
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall 
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall 
never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it 
may be a government of laws and not of men. 
46 387 Mass. 550, 555-56, 441 N.E.2d at 525, 527. 
47 See, e.g., Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 327 Mass. 310, 98 N.E.2d 621 
(1951); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230,69 N.E.2d lIS (1949). 
48 387 Mass. at 556-57,559-61,441 N.E.2d at 528, 529 (Liacos, J., dissenting). The case 
which Justice Liacos primarily relied upon for his assertion that the amendment process 
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In his dissent Justice Liacos stated that the majority should have focused 
its attention SQuarely on the issue of whether the Governor can directly 
reconvene the General Court into joint session after prorogation.49 Accord-
ing to Justice Liacos, that the "Governor and the General Court could have 
reasonably concluded that the Legislature had been properly reconvened 
... into joint constitutional session" 50 or that the Legislature" acquiesced" 
to the Governor's action, is irrelevanL51 Rather, Justice Liacos stated, the 
court had a duty to scrutinize carefully the amendment process in order to 
assure that it was accomplished pursuant to a clearly conferred constitu-
tional grant of power. 52 Quoting from a prior case construing article 48, as 
amended by article 81, Justice Liacos noted: 
Since the people have themselves adopted the constitution with its amend-
ments for their government, they are bound by the provisions and conditions 
which they themselves have placed in it, and when they seek to enact laws by 
direct popular vote they must do so in strict compliance with those provisions 
and conditions .... Failure to comply will mean no valid law has been 
enacted, no matter how great the popular majority may have been in its 
favor. Only by preserving this fundamental principle can constitutional gov-
ernment be preserved and orderly progress assured. S3 
Moreover, Justice Liacos continued, that the Legislature believed itself to 
be properly reconvened is meaningless. 54 The Legislature can only be 
convened in a manner authorized by the constitution. 55 In Opinion of the 
should be carefully scrutinized is Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 327 Mass. 310, 
98 N.E.2d 621 (1951). Sears was concerned with whether an initiative law, as contrasted 
with an initiative amendment, had been adopted consistently with the requirement of article 
48, The Initiative, part II, section 3, as amended by article 74. The Court noted that prior to 
the adoption of article 48 in 1918, the power to enact laws resided solely with the legislature. 
327 Mass. at 320, 98 N.E.2d at 629. Article 48, however, enabled the people to playa direct 
role in enacting legislation, provided that the legislation was enacted "in a carefully pre-
scribed manner and with certain precisely defined safeguards .... " Id. The Sears Court 
noted that" lilt would be astonishing and intolerable if the safeguards so carefully inserted in 
Art. 48 could be disregarded without consequences by individual state officers and so in 
effect turned into mere admonitions and recommendations. The Constitution is not ordinar-
ily treated in that manner." Id. at 321-22, 98 N.E.2d at 629. See infra notes 52 and 53 and 
accompanying text. 
49 387 Mass. at 556, 441 N.E.2d at 528 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 555, 441 N.E.2d at 527. 
51 /d. at 561, 441 N.E.2d at 530. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 559, 441 N.E.2d at 528 (quoting Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 327 
Mass. 310, 320-21, 98 N.E.2d 621, 629 (1951». 
54 Id. at 561, 441 N.E.2d at 530. 
55 Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 623,626,3 N.E.2d 218, 220 (1936). In that case the 
Court observed that the constitution recognizes three different methods for convening the 
General Court: 1) by constitutional mandate that it assemble at a specified time during the 
year; 2) by directive from the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Executive 
Council, that it assemble because the welfare of the state so requires it; 3) by the power of 
self-assembly.Id. at 625, 3 N.E.2d at 220. 
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With regard to the first method, several provisions of the constitution are implicated. 
Section 3 of article 64 provides that "[t]he General Court shall assemble every year on the 
first Wednesday in January." MASS. CONST. art. 64, § 3. Part I, chapter 1, section 1, article 
1, provides: 
The department oflegislation shall be formed by two branches, a Senate and House of 
representatives: each of which shall have a negative on the other. The legislative body 
shall assemble every year [on the last Wednesday in May, and at such other times as 
they shall judge necessary; and shall dissolve and be dissolved on the day next 
preceding the said last Wednesday in May;] and shall be styled, The GENERAL 
COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
MASS. CONST. part I, ch. 1, § 1, art. 1. In 1831 this provision was modified by article 10. 
Article 10 reads in pertinent part: 
The political year shall begin on the First Wednesday of January instead of the last 
Wednesday of May, and the General Court shall assemble every year, on the said first 
Wednesday of January, and shall proceed at that Session to make all the elections, 
and do all the other acts which are by the Constitution required to be made and done 
at the Session which has heretofore commenced on the last Wednesday of May. And 
the General Court shall be dissolved on the day next preceding the first Wednesday of 
January, without any proclamation or other act of the Governor. But nothing herein 
contained shall prevent the General Court from assembling at such other times as 
they shall judge necessary, or when called together by the Governor. 
MASS. CONST. art. 10. 
With regard to the second method, part 2, chapter 2, section 1, article 5 authorizes the 
Governor to recall the General Court after its adjournment or prorogation assuming that the 
Welfare of the Commonwealth requires that recall. See supra note 21. 
With regard to the third method, that of self assembly pursuant to both article 10 and part 
I, chapter 1, section 1, article 1, notes to the debates of the 1863 constitutional convention 
indicate that this power of self assembly is a manifestation of the Legislature's intended 
independence from the Governor. 3 Debates ofthe Constitutional Convention 666-67 (1853). 
See also Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 664,666,22 N.E.2d 261, 263 (1939); Opinion of 
the Justices, 294 Mass. 623, 625-26, 3 N.E.2d 218,220 (1936). This power of self-assembly 
may be provided for while the General Court is actually in session or subsequent to its 
adjournment or prorogation. In Opinion of the Justices the Court noted that the General 
Court, while in session, could determine that it would be necessary for it to reconvene at a 
time subsequent to its prorogation but before the expiration of its term. 294 Mass. at 626-27, 
3 N.E.2d at 220-21. The Supreme Judicial Court emphasized, however, that for the General 
Court to validly exercise its power of self-assembly, the members of the General Court, as 
such, would have to be accorded an opportunity to express their opinion as to the need for 
the special session. ld. This, according to the court, could be accomplished by resolution or 
rule. /d. at 627,3 N.E.2d at 221. The presiding officers of both houses, however, could not, 
sua sponte, make that determination. ld. In a subsequent adVISOry opinion, the Court 
expanded its prior ruling so as to permit the General Court to make the decision regarding 
self-assembly at a time when it was not in session. Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 664, 
674,22 N.E.2d 261, 269 (1936). The Court again cautioned, however, that "[a]n essential 
feature of [self assembly] ... is that every member of each branch of the General Court shall 
have a reasonable opportunity to express in an orderly manner his opinion as to the 
necessity for a special assession on a specified date." ld. at 675, 22 N.E.2d at 269. 
The above cited provisions of the constitution, of course, pertain to convening the General 
Court. Of additional relevance, perhaps, are other provisions regarding prorogation, recess, 
and adjournment of the General Court. Part II, chapter 2, section 1, article 5 authorizes the 
Governor, with the consent of the Executive Council, to prorogue the General Court "to any 
time the two houses shall desire." MASS. CONST. part II, ch. 2, § 1, art. 5. See supra note 21. 
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Justices,56 the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the constitution recog-
nizes three different methods by which the General Court can convene: 
"(1)[A] constitutional mandate to assemble on a specified date each 
year, (2) authority in the Governor with advice of the council to call it into 
session at other times, and (3) power in itself to assemble at other times 
upon judging that course to be necessary." 57 The Legislature can accom-
plish self assembly, therefore, only "according to law."58 As construed by 
Justice Liacos, the General Court, as a body, must affirmatively decide that 
it is necessary to convene.59 Presiding officers from each house, for exam-
ple, cannot, sua sponte, make that determination.60 In this case, therefore, 
because the General Court had not determined as a body that it was 
necessary to reconvene, whether it had been properly recalled turned on 
whether the Governor alone possessed the power to assemble. According to 
Justice Liacos, however, article 48, as amended by article 81, the provision 
which empowers the Governor to convene the General Court into joint 
session, presupposes that the General Court already is in session as a 
legislature.61 Because the General Court had not been properly convened, 
Justice Liacos reasoned, its favorable vote on the capital punishment 
amendment was invalid.62 Justice Liacos therefore concluded that the 
amendment had not received favorable votes from a majority of the mem-
bers at two different terms of the General Court and thus should not have 
been submitted to the people.63 
Of course, this is precisely what happened in Backman. On July 2, 1980, the two houses, 
then in joint constitutional session, adjourned. 387 Mass. at 551, 441 N.E.2d at 525. On July 
5, 1980, at the request of the General Court, the Governor prorogued the two houses until 
the final day of the annual session. Id. 
With regard to recess, Article 102 provides that "[tlhe General Court, by concurrent vote 
of the two houses, may take a recess or recesses amounting to not more than thirty days." 
MASS. CONST. art. 102. 
With regard to adjournments the constitution provides: "The Senate shall have the power 
to adjourn themselves, provided such adjournments do not exceed two days at a time." 
MASS. CONST. part II, ch. I, § 2, art. 6. "The House of Representatives shall have the power 
to adjourn themselves; provided such adjournment shall not exceed two days at a time." 
MASS. CONST. part II, ch. I, § 3, art. 8. 
56 294 Mass. 623, 3 N.E.2d 218 (1936). 
57 /d. at 625, 3 N.E.2d at 220. 
58 Id. at 626, 3 N.E.2d at 220. 
59 387 Mass. at 560, 441 N.E.2d at 530. See also Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 664, 
675,22 N.E.2d 261, 269 (1939); Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 623, 626, 3 N.E.2d 218, 
220 (1936). 
60 387 Mass. at 560, 441 N.E.2d at 530. See Opinion ofthe Justices, 294 Mass. 623,627,3 
N.E.2d 218, 220 (1936). 
61 387 Mass. at 561, 441 N.E.2d at 530 (Liacos, J., dissenting). See supra note 21. 
62 Id. at 562, 441 N.E.2d at 531. 
63 /d. 
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